



































































This study analyses the association between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
and Cost of Capital for companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600 index, from 2002 to 
2018. The Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and Easton (2004) models are used to 
compute an ex-ante cost of equity measure, while the cost of debt is measured as the ratio 
of interest expenses to total interest-bearing debt. A measure of Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) was computed using the Combined ESG (Environmental, Social and 
Governance) Score from Refinitiv. Results suggest that CSP is priced by both debt and equity 
markets. Furthermore, a negative relationship between CSP and cost of equity is found, while 
the relationship between CSP and cost of debt is positive. Additional tests suggest that equity 
markets penalize firms lagging in CSP when compared with industry peers, while debt 
markets penalize industry leaders in CSP. The results are robust for alternative measures of 
CSP, cost of equity and cost of debt. Furthermore, the associations do not hold during periods 
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is increasingly becoming a key theme across the 
business sector. Issues such as climate change, wealth disparity, inequality and the management 
of scarce resources have forced companies to rapidly adapt to new consumer behaviours and 
regulations. Furthermore, the European Union’ commitments on environmental and 
sustainability issues have been playing a major role in how companies allocate capital in pursuit 
of CSR activities, beyond the generation of profit.  
Cost of capital is a fundamental force driving investment decisions. Debt markets are 
gradually incorporating CSR performance measurements in their lending practices, while 
equity markets increasingly perceive CSR investments as a source of risk mitigation. Since cost 
of capital (COC) reflects what is value relevant, the adoption of such measures suggests that 
corporate social performance (CSP) generates value and is priced by investors and lenders in 
their activities.  
However, there is no consensus on the association between CSP and the cost of equity 
(COE) and debt (COD). Most empirical research points to a negative relationship between CSP 
and cost of equity (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008; El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok & Mishra, 2011; 
El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kim & Park, 2018) and cost of debt (Goss & Roberts, 2011; Oikonomou, 
Brooks & Pavelin, 2014; Du, Weng, Zeng, Chang & Pei, 2017). Accordingly, higher 
investments in socially responsible activities help decrease both interest rates on debt and equity 
premia. Contrarily, other studies find a positive relationship between COC and CSP 
(Magnanelli & Izzo, 2017; Menz, 2010) or an inconclusive one (Salama, Anderson & Toms, 
2011; Humphrey, Lee & Shen, 2012; Gregory, Tharyan & Whittaker, 2014).  
Furthermore, an increasing body of literature shows that other factors have an impact on the 
association between COC and CSP, such as industry membership (Reverte, 2012; Gregory, 
Whittaker & Yan, 2016; El Ghoul et al., 2018) and country-level factors such as stakeholder 
orientation, financial transparency and governance (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang, 2014; Gupta, 
2018). This study aims to fill a gap in the literature, analysing the association between COC 
and CSR in the European context, as well as if this relationship holds considering different 
economic contexts.  
To study the associations between CSP and cost of equity and CSP and cost of debt, a 
sample consisting of 413 firms from the STOXX Europe 600 (STOXX600) is used, belonging 
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to 17 countries of the European Union, for the 2002 to 2018 period. This study employs an ex-
ante cost of equity measure, using the abnormal growth models of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005), as implemented by Gode and Mohanram (2003), and Easton (2004). The cost of debt 
model follows La Rosa, Liberatore, Mazzi and Terzani, (2018). CSP was measured through the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Combined Score provided by Refinitiv.  
 Results from this study point to a statistically significant positive relationship between a 
firm’s COD and CSP, suggesting that lenders perceive CSR activities as a waste of a firm’s 
resources, in line with overinvestment theory. This finding is consistent with Sharfman and 
Fernando (2008), Menz (2010) and Magnanelli and Izzo (2017). Regarding the COE–CSP 
association, results show a negative relationship between both variables, in line with Sharfman 
and Fernando (2008) and El Ghoul et al. (2011, 2018). This suggests equity markets perceive 
CSR investments as a source of value, possible through risk mitigation theory. 
After segmenting the sample into firms bellow and above industry median CSP, results 
show that lenders penalize firms for their efforts to be industry leaders in CSR, while not finding 
evidence that they reward those who invest less than their peers. An inverse association is found 
regarding how equity markets perceive CSR investments. Results show that investors penalize 
firms who are laggers in CSR with higher required equity premiums, while no significant COE-
CSP association is found for CSR leaders. This suggests that the industry median CSP score 
acts as the optimal level, as investors penalize bellow industry performance and lenders penalize 
above industry performance. This also accords with Ye and Zhang (2011) and Bae, Chang and 
Yi (2018), who find optimal levels of CSR investments.  
The study results are robust for alternative measures of corporate social performance, cost 
of debt and cost of equity, as well as to alternative models that explore the association between 
cost of capital and corporate social performance.  
An additional test explores if the relationship is robust during different economics 
conditions. Results show that the relationship is only statistically significant during period of 
stability, in line with La Rosa et al. (2018) and El Ghoul et al. (2018), implying that CSR is not 
value relevant to capital markets during crisis periods. 
This study offers important contributions to the literature. It provides evidence on the 
pricing of CSP by the capital markets. It further supports the growing importance of CSR when 
defining a business strategy, as its impact on COC urges managers to think beyond just financial 
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measures. Results point to divergent positioning by lenders and investors, forcing socially 
responsible managers to weight the cost of each source of capital when allocating resources. It 
further examines how capital markets perceive leaders and laggers in CSR within an industry. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the deviation seems to be irrelevant when already controlling for 
CSP and industry positioning. Finally, no evidence is found for the impact of CSR on cost of 
capital during financial crisis periods.  
The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review, 
where the models and definitions of COE, COD and CSP are presented and testable hypotheses 
are developed. Section 3 presents the samples and methodologies used. Section 4 discusses 
findings. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions, limitations and future research avenues.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Companies are facing increasing pressure from both shareholders and stakeholders to 
redesign their operations in a sustainable way. This includes rethinking sources of financing 
such as the issuance of green bonds, tapping into loans with ESG related constraints, deciding 
which projects to invest in and how to allocate investment portfolios sustainably. Additionally, 
firms have been trying to measure how CSR issues affect their businesses, while other firms 
have made their business to evaluate socially responsible performance through ratings. This 
paper explores both dimensions, focusing on how CSR ratings might affect the financial 
performance of a firm, particularly by measuring its impact on the cost of debt and equity 
capital.  
In general terms, firms have two sources of financing: debt and equity capital. Debt 
financing may come from public sources (by issuing debt securities in the public market) or 
private sources (for example bank loans). In both sources, cost of debt is the yield to maturity 
applied in the operation. Equity capital originates from shareholders. The cost of equity is the 
rate of return investors expect to obtain for investing in a firm’s stock. 
Corporate Social Responsibility is a subject that can be related to a panoply of concepts 
such as corporate social performance, corporate governance, corporate citizenship and 
corporate sustainability. All have the underlying aim of addressing the parallel obligations firms 
have, other than financial considerations (Freeman, 2010). McWilliams and Siegel (2001, p. 
117) defined Corporate Social Responsibility as “actions that appear to further some social 
good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law”. More recently, the 
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Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) concept has emerged, capturing most CSR 
related activities a firm might pursue (Starks, 2009).  
One of the first papers studying the relationship between CSR and cost of capital was by 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008). Drawing on risk mitigation theory, the authors hypothesize that 
an improved environmental risk management should lower a firm’s cost of debt and equity. 
With a sample of 267 U.S. companies, mixed results are reported. While cost of equity 
decreases with better environmental risk management, an increase in cost of debt is observed. 
The authors infer that the reason behind the increasing cost of debt might reside in the 
perception of environmental risk management activities as a waste of firm’s resources by the 
debt markets. Another possible explanation presented by authors involves the possible lack of 
control for the effects of increasing leverage and improved environmental risk management on 
cost of debt.  
2.1. Cost of Equity and CSR 
The cost of equity is the rate of return expected by investors for investing in a firm. To 
determine their required rate of return, investors measure the risk of a firm’s cash flows relative 
to alternative investment opportunities. El Ghoul et al. (2011) argue for a negative relationship 
between corporate and environmental responsibility and cost of equity, that is driven by both 
risk mitigation theory and an investor base perspective.  
The risk mitigation argument is that responsible firms present lower risk profiles in the eyes 
of investors, and thus will benefit from a lower cost of capital. In this view, there is a lower 
probability of adverse events happening to responsible firms, and in case they occur, CSR can 
act a cushion to mitigate such effects.  
Risk mitigation builds on the stakeholder theory framework, in which the business is seen 
as a net of relationships between its stakeholders. These relationships are managed by 
executives with the responsibility of maximizing and distributing stakeholder value (Freeman, 
2010). CSR can be seen as a way to improve these relationships by reducing the probability of 
negative events such as costly lawsuits and clean-ups from environmental damage, unsafe 
products recalls, strikes from dissatisfied employees and brand and reputation erosion from 
scandals (Godfrey, 2005). In September 2015, Volkswagen (VW) admitted that 11 million of 
its diesel vehicles were equipped with a device whose purpose was to deceive laboratory diesel-
exhaust emission tests. As a result, VW not only lost one-third of its market capitalization from 
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a massive sell-off of its stock but also incurred in billions of dollars in costly regulatory fines, 
customer and shareholders’ legal actions, as well as other financial penalties (“A mucky 
business”, 2015).  
CSR can arguably be a competitive advantage, as good performers can motivate and attract 
more productive employees with less effort, avoid pollution fines and improve community and 
governmental relations with the company (Soloman & Hansen, 1985). Furthermore, empirical 
studies find that firms operating in “sin” businesses such as tobacco, gambling and alcohol face 
higher uncertain future claims and litigation risks than comparable firms in other industries (El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). Consistently, studies have shown that 
companies exposed to carbon risk carry increased uncertainty around regulatory, physical and 
business hazards (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008; Bauer & Hann, 2010; Schneider, 2011; Chen 
& Gao, 2012). Such events greatly impact the firm’s perceived image, which can materially 
worsen its’ overall risk profile and profitability (Smith, 1994; Boutin-Dufresne & Savaria, 
2004; Kim, Li & Li, 2014; Krüger, 2015). Since CSR might act as an “insurance” against 
negative events, companies with high CSR scores should display lower idiosyncratic risks. 
By defining a moral capital framework, Godfrey (2005) argues that if a company 
experiences such a negative event, a good record of social responsibility can act as insurance 
against stakeholder boycott and cash outflows. Accordingly, a good record of CSR performance 
enables firms to build moral capital, i.e., goodwill among stakeholders which can function as a 
risk management tool. Moreover, Godfrey (2005) proposes that companies which engage in 
philanthropic activities to "fit in" or to obtain shareholders moral approval, tend to generate 
negative moral capital, whereas companies that have a genuine interest and activities in line 
with its values tend to generate positive moral capital. Testing the effect of 178 negative 
regulatory and legal actions taken upon firms in an 11-year span, Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen 
(2009) found that firms engaged in CSR activities aimed at society benefited from the 
“insurance quality” of moral capital, while such activities directed at the firm’s trading partners 
had no such effect. 
Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001) have introduced a theoretical framework through which 
the CSR-COC relationship is explored based on investors base theory. The authors categorize 
risk-averse investors into green and neutral, and firms into green, polluting and reformed. When 
building their portfolios, neutral investors are indifferent to the ethical behaviour of a firm, 
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while green investors only invest in firms that meet their ethical criteria. According to the 
framework, with lower demand for their stocks, polluting firms have a smaller investor base, 
finding risk harder to diversify. This lack of demand and risk-sharing ability leads to a decrease 
in the polluting firms’ share price as well as a higher cost of equity capital (Merton, 1987). 
Heinkel et al. (2001) have demonstrated that at least 25% of investors need to be green to 
prompt polluting firms to change their behaviour and invest in greener technologies. Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) provide evidence that U.S. institutions with greater social-norm constraints, 
such as pension funds, hold fewer sin stocks in their portfolio than less norm-constrained 
institutions, such as mutual or hedge funds, as the latter are less exposed to news and analyst’s 
coverage. Furthermore, the authors find that sin stocks present higher expected returns than 
comparable stocks, as investors face higher risks related to litigation actions. El Ghoul et al. 
(2011) have concluded that better CSR performers exhibit a lower cost of equity and that 
companies in the nuclear power and tobacco industries display a significantly higher cost of 
equity capital among U.S. sin stocks. Chava (2014) provides further evidence that investors 
require higher returns on stocks excluded by environmental screens related to chemical hazards, 
emissions and climate change concerns when compared with firms without such concerns. 
According to Chava (2014), sin firms see lower demand for their stock from institutional 
investors and see a lower bank participation rate in their loan syndicate.  
In contrast, some authors find little to no evidence for the negative relationship between 
CSP and the cost of equity. While estimating the cost of equity in green and toxic portfolios, 
Gregory et al. (2014) claim that although the market associates CSR strengths with improved 
financial performance, the effect derives mainly from a greater expectation of future growth 
rather than cost of equity capital. Moreover, several studies are inconclusive: Gregory et al. 
(2016) show that the lower cost of equity exhibited by firms with high CSP is a result of industry 
membership and, once controlled for, the effect of cost of capital on firm’ value is minimal. In 
the British context, Salama et al. (2011) report an economically meaningless negative 
relationship between systematic financial risk and environmental performance. Similarly, 
Humphrey et al. (2012) find no impact of different levels of CSP on the risk-adjusted 
performance of U.K. based firms. Some authors even suggest an optimal level of CSP. 
Stemming from overinvestment theory, Bartkus, Morris and Seifert (2002) suggest that 
managers may overinvest in philanthropy beyond an optimal level for self-interests, at the 
shareholders' expense.  
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 Data from several studies suggest that the business cycle might play a part in this 
relationship. A study by El Ghoul et al. (2018) points out that during non-crisis periods, 
corporate environmental responsibility (CER) can help reduce the probability and costs of 
adverse events such as environmental scandals, while during the global financial crisis of 2008, 
the financial distress and bankruptcy costs had a higher priority than decreasing the probability 
of such events. During periods of crisis, investors seem to prefer firms with better short-term 
financial performance as opposed to higher CER performance. This finding is consistent with 
that of Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2015), who report that high-CSR firms exhibited higher 
stock returns than low-CSR firms during the 2008–2009 financial crisis. 
Taken together, while most empirical research is in favour of a negative relationship 
between CSP and COE, there is a relatively small body of literature that finds little or no support 
for it. This inconsistency may be due to other variables that play a role on the relationship, such 
as the type of measure used to assess CSP, industry membership, the choice of sample and other 
cultural and institutional factors that impact the context of the firm (Schoenmaker, Gianfrate & 
Wasama, 2018).  
2.2. Cost of Debt and CSR 
Proponents of CSR defend a negative relationship between it and cost of debt, arguing that 
responsible firms are perceived as less risky by lenders and thus should obtain better financing 
conditions. On the other hand, opponents of CSR argue that such activities represent a waste of 
limited and finite resources and firms that pursue such activities destroy value, suggesting a 
positive relationship between both variables.  
The main driver of cost of debt is a firm’s default risk. This risk is assessed by the capital 
markets, composed of credit institutions, rating agencies and the bond markets. The level of 
default risk of a company stems from its ability to meet future obligations through debt 
repayments. The greater the uncertainty of its future activities, the higher the default probability 
and risk, thus the higher the cost of debt. As previously argued, the uncertainty of a firm’s future 
activities – idiosyncratic risk - can originate from unexpected negative events. Since lenders 
are exposed to the borrowers’ idiosyncratic risk in their lending activities, they may require 
higher interest payments, additional guarantees on the loan and/or offer lower maturity rates to 
compensate for that risk. A similar argument applies to bad corporate social behaviour, as 
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creditors also bear reputational risk derived from their clients’ actions and may require 
borrowers to mitigate such CSR related risks. 
As specialized risk appraisers, lenders have an incentive to incorporate CSR measures in 
their risk assessment models. Prior research reports that lenders are increasingly incorporating 
environmental and carbon issues into their lending decisions (Thompson, 1998; Coulson & 
Monks, 1999; Thompson & Cowton, 2004; Cogan, 2008; Weber, 2012). Attig, El Ghoul and 
Guedhami (2013) suggest that more socially responsible firms exhibit higher credit ratings, 
consistent with the idea that these firms have a lower risk. Consequently, firms with higher 
credit quality should obtain better borrowing conditions and a lower spread on their loans 
(Coulson & Monks, 1999; Soppe, 2004). This relationship seems to hold in the United States, 
both with private lenders and the public debt markets, with factors such as geography having a 
larger impact in the relationship than the widely studied industry effect (Erragragui, 2018; Ge 
& Liu, 2015; Jiraporn, Jiraporn, Boeprasert & Chang, 2014). Similar results are found in 
European companies. A recent study by La Rosa et al. (2018) reports a negative relationship 
between a firm’s CSP and cost of debt in a sample of firms included in the S&P Europe 350 
index, from 2005 to 2012. The authors further conclude that improved CSP is associated with 
higher credit ratings. 
Similarly, Oikonomou et al. (2014) find that a good CSP is rewarded with a lower cost of 
debt while a bad performance penalizes it. Based on an extensive sample of 3,240 U.S. bond 
issues across 17 different industries, from 1991 to 2008, the authors investigate the separate 
impact of the several dimensions of CSP on corporate debt pricing and the credit quality of 
bond issues. Results show that CSR dimensions such as greater product safety and quality, local 
community support and good relations with employees, all contribute to a lower corporate bond 
yield spread. 
Overall, there is support for a negative relationship between CSP and COD based on risk 
mitigation theory. The risk reduction is further corroborated with the research done on the 
association between credit ratings and CSP. Some papers quantified this reduction of cost of 
debt: Jung, Herbohn and Clarkson (2018) showed that Australian firms with higher carbon risk 
and lower risk awareness paid 38 to 62 basis points more on their loans than more aware 
companies. Using a larger sample of 1,265 U.S. companies between 1991 and 2006, Goss and 
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Roberts (2011) study the relationship between bank loans and KLD1 strengths and concerns 
and find that firms exhibiting CSR concerns are penalized with an increase of 7 to 18 basis 
points on their bank loans. Interestingly, the authors find that credit providers penalize low-
quality borrowers that engage in CSR activities but are indifferent to high-quality borrowers 
that engage in similar activities.  
Some argue that stakeholders and societal demands are now pressuring corporations to 
engage in activities that promote the general public well-being, resulting in a deviation from a 
strict profit maximization objective. This view is commonly called delegated philanthropy. 
Investors, customers and employees are willing to give up personal benefits such as purchasing 
power to improve social well-being, for example, by paying higher prices for more sustainable 
products and demanding companies to adopt more sustainable practices (Benabou & Tirole, 
2010). Managers are thus pressured to invest beyond what is financially optimal.  
Recent events document demanding pressure from stakeholders, especially in bigger, more 
profitable firms that produce final goods. In July 2019, Amazon workers from the United States 
and Europe left their work for six hours to protest against their employer workload practices 
and the abuse of temporary job contracts. Thousands of workers were planning to strike later 
in the year due to the inaction of Amazon regarding climate change. Other workers from some 
of the biggest technology companies, such as Google and Microsoft, were also planning on 
joining the protests. These companies quickly tried to prevent such events by announcing 
measures to address their employees’ complaints. Jeff Bezos, from Amazon, announced the day 
before the strike that by 2030, Amazon would be entirely powered by renewable energy and 
would have net-zero carbon emissions by 2040. Google followed a similar approach and 
increased its investment in renewable energies (“Hundreds of workers defy Amazon rules”, 
2020).  
Overinvestment theory, an alternative to risk mitigation theory, draws its support from 
agency theory (Jo & Harjoto, 2012). The view is that discretionary investments in socially and 
environmentally responsible activities pose a costly deviation from the optimal use of scarce 
resources (Goss & Roberts, 2011).  
 
1 Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD), also known as MSCI ESG STATS, is a financial advisor who 
provides social screening of firms to clients via its reports and socially screened mutual funds. 
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Some argue that managers overinvest in philanthropy and CSR to improve their own image, 
as good behaviours benefit the manager’s reputation at the cost of the shareholder (Barnea & 
Rubin, 2010). Friedman (1962) first argued that the pursuit of philanthropic activities by 
corporations is inefficient and should be left to individual shareholders, reflecting information 
asymmetry and agency problems between managers and shareholders (Boatsman & Gupta, 
1996; Jensen, 2000). Either way, lenders that perceive these activities as resource wasteful will 
require higher returns. Following Goss and Roberts (2011), both types of excess spending will 
be considered under the overinvestment hypothesis, proposing that companies with better CSR 
scores have higher levels of cost of capital. Accordingly, the overinvestment hypothesis posits 
that a firm's CSR engagement is a diversion of corporate resources and thus makes the firm 
more vulnerable to credit screening by lenders, resulting in a higher cost of capital.  
Menz (2010) was the first paper focusing solely on the relationship between COD and CSP. 
Menz (2010) analysed the relationship between 498 Euro corporate bonds spreads and 
RobecoSAM CSR scores, observed over 38 months. Following a similar risk mitigation 
argument to Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Menz (2010) hypothesized a negative relationship 
between CSR scores and firms’ credit spreads. However, the study found a weak positive 
relationship between both variables. The author concluded that it is possible that the credit 
ratings used in the model already account for CSR issues and that an additional non-certified 
CSR rating does not improve the explanatory power of CSR to bondholders. This conclusion is 
interesting given the previous noted explanatory power of credit ratings on lower credit costs. 
Additionally, agency conflicts regarding the difficulty of simultaneous shareholder and 
bondholder value creation could help explain the results. In Suto and Takehara (2017), the 
authors study the relationship between CSP and COD, finding a positive link between both 
variables in the period spanning 2008 to 2013. The relationship is significant only for the 2008 
to 2010 period, indicating that during the financial crisis, lenders saw CSR spending as a risk 
to the future of the company, pricing this risk through cost of debt.  
In a sample of 332 international firms, Magnanelli and Izzo (2017) also find a positive 
significant relationship between cost of bank debt and CSP in the period from 2005 to 2009. 
This may be derived from the sample selection, where 40% of the companies operate in the 
U.S., where CSR activities may not be regarded by lenders as a source of value due to greater 
stakeholder-centricity. Furthermore, like Menz (2010), Magnanelli and Izzo (2017) include 
financial companies in their sample and obtain their CSR ratings from RobecoSAM database. 
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This may bias the results because the amount of bonds issued by financial services reduces 
cross-industrial variance (thus most researchers exclude them).  
In a literature review, Schoenmaker et al. (2018) analysed 58 articles that focus on the 
relationship between CSP and cost of (debt and equity) capital. The authors find that the 
majority of studies report a negative relationship between the cost of equity and CSP, but some 
do not find any statistically significant relationship, or just a weak and economically negligible 
one, rendering the overall relationship inconclusive. The mixed conclusions can be a result of 
the measure of sustainability used and other external factors that play a role on the relationship, 
such as country-level characteristics, the voluntary or mandatory disclosure of CSR reports and 
external assurance. The same heterogeneity of results issue is present in the COD - CSP 
relationship, with results varying with the type of measurement used, and its’ strength and 
direction are influenced by other external factors such as securitization, credit ratings and 
country-level institutional and cultural characteristics.  
The research done until now has focused on the linear relationship between COC and CSP. 
Focusing on the cost of debt side, Ye and Zhang (2011) and Bae et al. (2018) have examined 
the existence of a non-linear relationship between COD and CSP, finding a “U-shaped” 
association between both variables that points to an optimal level of CSP. 
Ye and Zhang (2011) are the first researchers to document a U-Type relationship between 
both variables. The authors fundament their hypothesis on risk mitigation theory, examining if 
better CSP - measured as the ratio of donations to charity over sales - reduces cost of debt in a 
sample of Chinese firms. The authors document a negative relationship between both variables 
for a ratio below 0.357. With higher charity contributions, the relationship turns to a positive 
one. Thus, cost of debt seems to be higher for extremely high or extremely low levels of CSP. 
When the authors divide their sample into an underinvestment group (CSR < 0.357) and an 
overinvestment subsamples (CSR > 0.357), they find negative and positive relationships, 
respectively. 
Bae et al. (2018) find the same type of relationship with a wide sample of 5,810 syndicated 
bank loans issued by U.S. firms, for the period of 1991-2008. The authors conclude that CSR 
strengths decrease loan spreads at a decreasing rate, while CSR concerns increase COD at a 
decreasing rate. The authors conclude that for borrowing firms which are not evaluated by 
rating agencies, investing in CSR is seen as inefficient and a waste of a firm’s funds. When 
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controlling for business cycles, the authors find that during the technology crisis (2000-2002) 
and the global financial crisis (2008), firms with CSR strengths saw lower spreads on their 
loans. Furthermore, the non-linearity effect remained significant during these periods, which 
indicates that the relationship is not sensitive to different periods. The nonlinearity effect of 
CSR on cost of debt suggest that lenders perceive CSP as a form of risk reduction, up until a 
certain level. After the optimal point is reached, creditors view CSR investments as ineffective 
and a costly use of a firm’s resources. 
This paper analyses the following research questions: 
Research question 1: Considering prior research support for both negative and positive 
relationships between cost of capital and CSP, it remains unclear if and how capital markets 
price investments in CSR.  
Research question 2: If there is an association between COC and CSP, does one theory 
prevail or do both risk mitigation and overinvestment views influence this relationship? 
Research question 3: Considering how the business cycle greatly influences how lenders 
and investors provide capital and how companies allocate it, how do more sustainable 
companies fare against less sustainable ones during periods of crisis? 
As previously noted, the literature on the association between cost of capital and CSP so far 
provides mixed results. Although some studies find no support for a relationship between both 
variables, literature reviews such as that conducted by Schoenmaker et al. (2018) have shown 
that most studies find a negative one. Accordingly, as markets seem to price CSP, an association 
between CSP and COC is expected: 
H1.A: There is an association between CSP and cost of debt. 
H1.B: There is an association between CSP and cost of equity. 
From the cost of equity point of view, risk mitigation, moral capital and the investor base 
frameworks point to a decrease in equity premiums derived from better CSP (Heinkel et al., 
2001; Godfrey, 2005). Other studies find no support for the relationship or even suggest a 
positive one (Bartkus et al., 2002). McWilliams and Siegel (2001) and Godfrey (2005) 
advanced the idea of an optimal level of CSR investment with regards to cost of equity, while 
Ye and Zhang (2011) and Bae et al. (2018) provide support for such optimal level on the cost 
of debt side, in the American and Asian contexts. These studies suggest that both risk mitigation 
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and overinvestment theories play a role in pricing corporate social investments, echoing how 
lenders and investors perceive firms who under or overinvesting in CSR. In this sense, the 
following hypotheses are advanced:  
H2.A: The association between COD and CSP changes as firms under or overinvest in CSR.  
H2.B: The association between COE and CSP changes as firms under or overinvest in CSR. 
As business cycles greatly influence how firms allocate their capital, corporate social 
investments may vary according to different periods of economic growth and crisis. 
Accordingly, lenders and investors might perceive CSR investments differently during such 
periods.  
H3.A: CSR investments are perceived differently by lenders during periods of crisis. 
H3.B: CSR investments are perceived differently by investors during periods of crisis. 
3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample Construction 
In order to study the relationship between CSP and cost of equity and debt, the following 
databases were used: (a) Refinitiv, which provides comprehensive ESG Scores on more than 
9,000 public companies since 2002, (b) Thompson Institutional Brokers Earnings Services 
(I/B/E/S), which provides consensus analyst forecast data and (c) Compustat, which provides 
financial data and industry affiliation.  
To confirm the data is homogeneous, I sample firms from the STOXX Europe 600 index, 
for the 2002 – 2018 time-period. The STOXX600 index has a fixed number of 600 constituents, 
representing large, mid and small capitalization companies across 17 countries of the European 
region. All constituent companies in the index are selected, except for companies belonging to 
the financial sector, as their capital market decisions are greatly constrained by industry-specific 
regulation, fundamentally different from non-financial industries (Pittman & Fortin, 2004). 
Furthermore, companies with unavailable ESG scores or insufficient data to compute cost of 
capital metrics are also excluded from the sample. To study the individual relationships between 
CSP and cost of equity and cost of debt, and based on different data availability, I separate the 
data in two different samples, which will be the base for the models described in subsequent 
sections. To facilitate the analysis, I will refer to them as the cost of equity and cost of debt 
samples from this point forward. For both samples, I exclude firm-year observations with 
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negative shareholder’s equity values, as these represent companies in financial distress and 
thus, their financing sources and conditions have different characteristics from those which this 
study targets. Finally, to minimize estimation biases from extreme values, I exclude dependent 
variables’ observations at 1% and 99% percentiles. 
3.2. ESG Score 
Refinitiv database from Thomson Reuters (2020) offers one of the most comprehensive 
databases on ESG performance, covering close to 9,000 companies globally, with a time-series 
going back to 2002.  
The underlying ESG data framework encompasses 450 company-level ESG measures based 
on verifiable reported data in the public domain. Each measure is grouped into the following 
10 categories that are rolled up into an environmental, social or corporate governance pillar 
score: resource use; emissions; innovation; workforce; human rights; community; product 
responsibility; management; shareholders; CSR strategy.  
The scoring is built on a percentile rank methodology, producing a 0 to 100 score in each 
category, based on each company’s relative performance to its sector (for the environmental 
and social categories) and country of incorporation (for the governance category) peers. After 
the rank attribution, the category score is computed based on three factors: how many 
companies are worse than the current one; how many companies have the same value; and how 
many companies have a value at all. The category score is derived from the following equation:  
(1)  𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
# 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 
# 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
2
 
# 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
ESG scores are aggregated based on the 10 category weights, which are calculated based 
on the Refinitiv magnitude matrix.2  
Furthermore, Refinitiv computes an ESG Controversies Score, which discounts the ESG 
performance score based on negative media stories captured from global media sources. During 
the year, if a company is involved in a scandal or related to a negative event (e.g. lawsuits, 
ongoing legislation disputes or fines), its ESG controversies score is penalized. Impacts related 
to developments linked to the negative event may still be reflected in the subsequent year score. 
 
2 Detailed ESG Score calculations are available in Thomson Reuters (2020).  
JOÃO DIAS CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND COST OF CAPITAL 
15 
 
The controversies score also controls for market capitalization bias resulting from more media 
attention being given to larger companies than smaller companies.  
A combined ESG score is computed based on these two scores, as the weighted average of 
the ESG scores and ESG controversies score per fiscal period when companies are involved in 
ESG controversies, with recent controversies reflected in the latest completed period. The ESG 
Combined Score equals the ESG Score when firms are not involved in ESG controversies. This 
research employs the Combined ESG Score (Comb_ESG) as a measure of a firm’s corporate 
social performance.  
3.3. Cost of Debt  
3.3.1. Cost of Debt Measure 
The ratio between a firm’s interest expenses to total interest-bearing debt outstanding has 
been used in the literature to study the relationship between cost of debt and corporate social 
performance (Ye & Zhang, 2011; Magnanelli & Izzo, 2017; La Rosa et al., 2018). I follow such 
studies and employ the same measure. Total debt comprises a firm’s total interest-bearing debt 
and is equal to the sum of short- and long-term debt. Financial expenses are expenses resulting 
from external financing.  
3.3.2. Sample Description 
The sample consists of 388 firms, belonging to 17 countries in the European Union and 12 
industry sectors3, totalling 4,383 firm-year observations.  
Appendix I presents the sample composition by country. Panel A demonstrates that the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany are the most represented countries in the sample, with 
25,58%, 15,40% and 11,34% respectively.  
Appendix II presents the sample composition by industry. In Panel A it is observed that 
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, and Basic Materials are the most represented industries in 
the sample, with 27,29%, 18,73% and 10,79% respectively.  
3.3.3. Methodology 
To test hypotheses H1.A to H3.A, three different models are adopted which aim to 
investigate any association between cost of debt and CSP, while controlling for firm-specific 
 
3 Based on ICB industry classification. 
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characteristics, as well as year, industry and country effects. Following La Rosa et al. (2018), 
Equation 2 seeks to test H1.A: 
(2) 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +
 𝛽13𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽14𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where i denotes each company and t the corresponding year. The measure of CSR 
performance (Comb_ESG) serves as the first independent variable and is computed as described 
in section 3.2. Firm control variables are defined as follows: 
Firm’s size (Size): Computed as the natural logarithm of a firm’s market value of equity, in 
thousands of euros. Studies suggest that the impact of negative events in a firm’s cash flows 
tend to be lower for larger firms, decreasing its default risk. Additionally, larger firms can 
provide more collateral than smaller firms, thus being viewed as less risky by lenders (Diamond, 
1989; Goss & Roberts, 2011). A negative association is predicted between Size and COD. 
Leverage (Lev): Computed as the ratio between total debt and the market value of equity. 
The leverage ratio has been shown to be positively correlated with cost of debt, based on the 
argument that default risk increases with leverage (Goss & Roberts, 2011). On the other hand, 
higher leverage ratios might also be associated with higher creditworthiness, resulting in a lower 
cost of debt (Ye & Zhang, 2011). Thus, it is difficult to predict the relationship between both 
variables.  
Interest coverage ratio (IntCov): Computed as the sum of income before extraordinary items 
and interest expenses, divided by interest expenses. A higher interest coverage ratio indicates 
that the firm can generate sufficient resources to meet its debt obligations, reducing debt costs 
(Álvarez-Botas & González, 2019). A negative sign is expected on IntCov.  
Tobin Q ratio (TobinQ): Measured as the sum of the market value of equity and total debt, 
divided by total assets. A low Tobin Q ratio (between 0 and 1) is usually representative of an 
undervalued stock, while a Tobin Q ratio higher than 1 implies that the stock is overvalued. It 
is analogous to the market-to-book ratio which has been used as a control for risk, market 
mispricing and a proxy for growth opportunities (Goss & Roberts, 2011). Based on prior 
research, a negative association between the TobinQ and cost of debt is expected. 
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Beta: The market beta is estimated by regressing daily stock returns on the STOXX600 
index (considered the European market proxy in this study) over the previous 5 years. Prior 
research suggests an adverse effect of a firm’s systematic risk on its creditworthiness and 
default probability and thus, on its cost of debt. (Attig et al., 2013). A positive sign is expected 
on Beta. 
Other typical control measures have been included: A measure of performance (Perf), 
computed as income before extraordinary items divided by sales; The ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities as a proxy for a firm’s liquidity (Liq); A measure of asset tangibility (Tang), 
computed as the ratio between property, plant and equipment and total assets; The yearly 
relative variation of total assets (AssetG) and; Operating Cash Flow (OCF), as the ratio between 
operating cash flow and total assets. All control variables should exhibit a negative association 
with the cost of debt (Goss & Roberts, 2011; Ye & Zhang, 2011; La Rosa et al., 2018).  
Finally, industry membership is controlled for with dummy variables, on the basis that 
different industries display different levels of perceived risk for lenders. Furthermore, country 
controls have also been included, considering how the culture and context of a firm influence 
how lenders of such firms perceive CSR investments (Schoenmaker et al., 2018). All variables 
are described in Appendix III with the respective computation formula.  
Under and overinvestments in CSR are measured by the variable IndDev, employed in 
Equation 3. IndDev measures CSP deviations from the industry median. Firms belonging to the 
same industry are subject to equivalent regulations and have similar access to sources of capital 
and investment opportunities. Furthermore, both social and financial performances are only 
meaningful when compared with firms operating in equivalent economic conditions. Thus, it 
makes sense for lenders and investors to categorize CSR investments as excessive or 
insufficient based on the industry CSP median level.  
(3) 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Finally, Equation 4 aims to further explore this deviation, namely, it tests if the magnitude 
of the deviation affects the relationship. SqrDev is added to the model, computed as the square 
of IndDev. Squaring the CSP deviation from the industry median allows controlling for firms 
with extremely low and high investments in CSR.  
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(4) 𝐶𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑞𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽12𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽15𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,t 
3.4. Cost of Equity 
3.4.1. Cost of Equity Measure 
The metric most often employed in empirical research to estimate the equity risk premium 
can be defined as the cost of equity capital less the risk-free rate of interest. There are two main 
types of study design used to study the relationship between CSR and cost of equity premium: 
the first one consists of estimating the cost of equity with an asset pricing model of firms which 
are sorted on a measure of corporate social performance. In the second method, an implied cost 
of equity is regressed on a measure of environmental performance and control variables 
(Schoenmaker et al., 2018). Concerning the first method, both the standard single-factor model 
and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model have been shown to provide poor proxies 
for the cost of equity (Fama & French, 1997). Additional concerns have been raised over 
conventional proxies for realized returns by Elton (1999), calling for alternative methods. On 
the other hand, an implied cost of equity approach has been argued to be particularly useful 
because it attempts to isolate cost of equity effects from growth and cash flow effects (Hail & 
Leuz, 2006, 2009; Chen, Chen and Wei, 2009). Furthermore, Pástor, Sinha and Swaminathan 
(2008) evidence supports that a class of implied cost of capital models reasonably capture the 
time-variation in expected returns. Based on the previous exposure, I follow the second strand 
of research and estimate the ex-ante cost of equity implied in current stock prices and analyst 
forecasts. 
While several methods currently exist for the measurement of implied cost of equity capital, 
the literature provides no consensus on their performance, or even on how to evaluate that 
performance. For example, Botosan and Plumlee (2005) argue that the proxies should be 
evaluated based on their relationship with known risk factors such as market risk, leverage, 
information risk, firm size, and growth. In opposition, Easton and Monahan (2010) defend that 
the appropriate criterion should be realized returns. Regarding the proxies, the most commonly 
used models to estimate cost of equity in the literature are the Claus and Thomas model (2001, 
CT), the (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan model (2001, GLS) the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
model (2005, OJ), and the Easton model (2004, ES). After assessing the performance of five 
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models, including the GLS, OJ and the price/earnings to growth (PEG) model, Botosan and 
Plumlee (2005) conclude that the PEG model proposed by Easton (2004) and the target price 
model proposed in Botosan and Plumlee (2002) were the superior ones. For this study, the most 
recent models of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and Easton (2004) were selected. Both 
have the benefit of being parsimonious. Furthermore, the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
measure is highly correlated the with Claus and Thomas (2001) measure, with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.945 (Hail & Leuz, 2006). As both OJ (KOJ) and ES (KES) measures can be a 
noisy proxy for the underlying “true” cost of equity capital, the average of the aforementioned 
two measures is used as the final proxy for the implied cost of equity, to the extent that as the 
noise represents random errors, the averaging methodology should potentially remove a 
fraction of that noise. Appendix A provides a brief explanation of both models.  
Following common methodology in the literature, I subtract the ten-year German Treasury 
bond yield from the estimated cost of equity of each model, yielding the risk premium. The 
final sample includes sample firms with valid cost of equity measures under both models as 
well as sufficient data on ESG and control variables.  
3.4.2. Sample Description 
The sample consists of 413 firms, belonging to 17 countries in the European Union and 12 
industry sectors, totalling 4,276 firm-year observations.  
Panel B in Appendix I presents the sample composition by country. It is observed that the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany are the most represented countries in the sample, with 
26,64%, 16,30% and 12,37% respectively. Panel B in Appendix II presents the sample 
composition by industry. It is observed that Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, and Health 
Care are the most represented industries in the sample, with 25,07%, 19,04% and 11,30% 
respectively.  
3.4.3. Methodology 
Regarding firm-specific control variables, I follow El Ghoul et al. (2011) and use size, 
leverage, the book-to-market ratio, the market beta, a long-term growth rate and earnings 
forecast dispersion, as well as year, industry and country effects. To examine H1.B, the 
following base model is employed: 
(5) 𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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The adaptations made to Equation 5 are analogous to those discussed in section 3.3.3. 
Equations 6 and 7 are used to test H2.B and H3.B: 
(6) 𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽11𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(7)  𝐶𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏_𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑞𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑇𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 +
 𝛽12𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where i denotes each company and t the corresponding year. The measure of CSR 
performance (Comb_ESG) serves as the first independent variable and is computed as described 
in section 3.2. Firm control variables are defined as follows: 
Beta: According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Beta should be positively 
associated with cost of equity. The market beta is estimated by regressing daily stock returns 
on the STOXX600 index (considered the European market proxy in this study) over the 
previous 5 years. As such, a positive coefficient is expected.  
Firm Size (Size): Computed as the natural logarithm of total assets, in thousands of euros. 
Fama and French (1992) suggest that that cost of equity is negatively related to a firm’s size, 
while Hail and Leuz (2006) provide evidence of this relationship using an implied cost of 
equity. A negative coefficient is expected regarding Size. 
Leverage (Lev): Computed as the ratio between total debt and the market value of equity. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) have shown that a higher leverage ratio increases cost of equity, 
when considering no taxes and transaction costs. Furthermore, higher subsequent stock returns 
are earned by higher levered firms (Fama and French, 1992). Thus, a positive association is 
expected.  
Book-to-market ratio (BTM): Computed as the ratio between book value and market value 
of equity. Fama and French (1992) suggest a positive relationship between the book-to-market 
ratio and implied cost of equity, as higher book-to-market firms are expected to earn higher ex- 
post returns than firms with low BTM. Furthermore, the book-to-market ratio is a proxy for a 
firm’s growth opportunities (La Porta, Lopez-de-Sinalizes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2002). Recent 
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studies such as Gebhardt et al. (2001), Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Hail and Leuz (2006) 
have provided support for a positive association, thus a positive sign is expected.  
Long-Term Growth Rate (LTG): The consensus five-year growth rate, available in I/B/E/S. 
Although it might be difficult to predict how long-term growth alone affects the implied cost 
of equity, Gode and Mohanram (2003) propose a positive association between both variables. 
The authors argue that high-growth firms tend to be perceived as risky by the market because 
of the significant impact any misestimation of growth have on prices, i.e., a higher probability 
of negative returns for high-growth firms. Thus, a positive association is expected.  
Forecast Dispersion (Disp): Provided by I/B/E/S, it is computed as the coefficient of 
variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecast. Disp is expected to be positively associated with 
the implied cost of equity, as earnings volatility can be regarded as a source of risk in firm 
valuations (Madden, 1999) and likely captures cash flows risk. 
In addition to firm-specific controls, year, industry and country controls are included in all 
regressions as Fama and French (1997) find that there is substantial variation in factor loadings 
across industries, while Hope (2003) shows that analyst forecast accuracy varies significantly 
across countries. 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Cost of Debt 
4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table I reports descriptive statistics for all variables in the cost of debt empirical model. 
The average cost of debt for a European firm is 4,83%, while on average, firms exhibit a 
leverage ratio of 0.2447, a liquidity ratio of 1.4498 and a performance of 7,77%. Regarding 
CSR measures, the average Combined ESG score stands at 53.5015, which indicates that firms, 
on average, are still half-way through their full sustainability potential.  
4.1.2. Correlation Matrix 
Appendix V presents the Pearson correlation matrix. A statistically significant negative 
correlation (-0.119) is found between cost of debt and Comb_ESG. Overall, there is a 
statistically significant correlation between the independent variables. The correlations between 
Size and Comb_ESG, with a coefficient of 0.401 and OCF and TobinQ, with a coefficient of 
0.730 (p-value < 0.01), are relatively high. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were 
JOÃO DIAS CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND COST OF CAPITAL 
22 
 
computed for all variables to test for potential multicollinearity. As the VIF statistics for each 
independent variable are only slightly above 1.0, multicollinearity is not a major concern and 
all variables are kept in the model (Neter, Wasserman & Kutner, 1985). 
Table I. COD Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 Obs. Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
COD 4383 0.0483 0.0438 0.0319 0.0002 0.4733 
Comb_ESG 4383 53.5015 54.58 18.6041 2.83 93.13 
Beta 4383 0.9081 0.9009 0.3307 0.0772 2.2817 
Size 4383 15.9851 15.8904 1.2119 11.4624 19.4417 
TobinQ 4383 1.4397 1.1487 1.3722 0.171 63.5675 
Liq 4383 1.4498 1.287 0.7644 0.1814 8.2926 
Lev 4383 0.2447 0.2369 0.1164 0.0184 0.5066 
AssetG 4383 0.0881 0.0434 0.3524 -0.8695 9.5997 
Tang 4383 0.2647 0.2176 0.1967 0.0002 0.9357 
Perf 4383 0.0777 0.0671 0.0913 -1.2597 1.3772 
IntCov 4383 15.0217 6.3072 55.2999 -228.4521 2330.2168 
OCF 4383 0.1024 0.0917 0.0736 -0.1608 2.7505 
All variables are described in Appendix III.  
 
4.1.3. Model Results 
Table II. reports the main results from the regressions estimated using the pooled Ordinary 
Least Squares method. In all models, cost of debt serves as the dependent variable. Several CSR 
metrics are included as explanatory variables, and every model specification includes ten firm-
specific control variables, as well as year, industry, and country effects.  
Regarding the association between the explanatory variable Comb_ESG and cost of debt, 
Model (1) shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level. This suggests 
that firms showing better corporate social performance pay higher interest rates on debt. This 
finding is consistent with that of Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Menz (2010) and Magnanelli 
and Izzo (2017), implying that lenders perceive CSR investments as a waste of a firm’s 
resources. As Comb_ESG is significant in all models at least at the 10% level, there is support 
for a relationship between CSP and COD, validating H1.A. 
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Table II. COD Regression Models Results 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.132*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 
 (16.55) (15.96) (15.98) 
Comb_ESG 0.000132*** -0.000235* -0.000238** 
 (4.66) (-1.95) (-1.97) 
IndDev  0.000376*** 0.000376*** 
  (3.14) (3.14) 
SqrDev   -0.00000115 
   (-0.97) 
Beta 0.00625*** 0.00700*** 0.00697*** 
 (3.93) (4.36) (4.34) 
Size -0.00315*** -0.00318*** -0.00319*** 
 (-7.09) (-7.17) (-7.20) 
TobinQ -0.00121** -0.00111** -0.00111** 
 (-2.39) (-2.18) (-2.19) 
Liq 0.00255*** 0.00263*** 0.00263*** 
 (3.99) (4.11) (4.11) 
Lev -0.0807*** -0.0807*** -0.0807*** 
 (-20.28) (-20.30) (-20.28) 
AssetG -0.00712*** -0.00713*** -0.00714*** 
 (-5.91) (-5.92) (-5.93) 
Tang -0.0101*** -0.00989*** -0.00981*** 
 (-3.74) (-3.66) (-3.63) 
Perf -0.00123 -0.00111 -0.000874 
 (-0.23) (-0.21) (-0.17) 
IntCov -0.0000800*** -0.0000802*** -0.0000804*** 
 (-9.73) (-9.76) (-9.78) 
CashFlow 0.0287*** 0.0275*** 0.0276*** 
 (3.17) (3.04) (3.05) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4383 4383 4383 
Adj. R-Squared 0.272 0.273 0.273 
F-Test 31.25 30.93 30.39 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (1), (2) and (3) – 
Pooled OLS. t statistics are presented in parentheses. 
All variables are defined in Appendix III.  
Model (2) further explores the CSP-COD relationship concerning deviations from the 
industry median. Interestingly, adding this variable to the model turns the coefficient on 
Comb_ESG negative and significant at the 10% level, while IndDev shows a positive sign, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. As deviations are measured in negative (CSP < industry 
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median) and positive (CSP > industry median) terms, this result indicates that firms 
underinvesting in CSP pay lower interests on debt (i.e., a negative IndDev measure times a 
positive coefficient), while firms with ESG scores above industry medians are penalized. These 
results are consistent with Ye and Zhang (2011) and Bae et al. (2018), suggesting the 
relationship between COD and CSP changes based on whether firms are under or overinvesting 
in CSR. Although this points to the acceptance of H1.B, these results are further explored in 
section 4.3. to better examine this association. 
Model (3) results show that the magnitude of the CSP deviation is not significant for the 
COD-CSP relationship. Here, the significance level of Comb_ESG coefficient increases to 5%. 
It seems that when already considering individual ESG scores and deviation from industry 
peers, the magnitude of the deviation does not impact the COD-CSP relationship. 
Regarding control variables, most display the predicted signs. Beta is positive and 
significant at the 1% level across all models, indicating that cost of debt increases with higher 
systematic risk. Size is negative and statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) in all models, as 
predicted by previous literature (Goss & Roberts, 2011; Sharfman & Fernando, 2008). 
Regarding variable TobinQ, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship with 
COD in all models (p-value < 0.05). Lev is negatively associated with COD at a 1% significance 
level, supportive of the argument that more creditworthy are able to take on more leverage. 
Variables AssetG, Tang and IntCov show the predicted negative association with COD across 
all models, with a significance level of 1%. As such, firms with more tangible assets 
(guarantees), higher interest coverage ratios, as well as positive asset growth, display a lower 
cost of debt. Perf also shows a negative coefficient, although not statistically significant. 
Variables Liq and OCF do not have the expected negative relation with cost of debt, although 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) and in line with La Rosa et al. (2018). 
4.2. Cost of Equity 
4.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table III presents the descriptive statistics regarding all variables in the cost of equity 
empirical models. The average implied cost of equity premium estimate for a European firm is 
8,55%, with the Easton model producing a higher mean estimate than the OJ model (8.68% and 
8,43% respectively), in line with El Ghoul et al. (2011). Similar to the cost of debt model results, 
European firms show an average Combined ESG score of 54,3284. Regarding control variables, 
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the average firm size is close to 𝑒(15.9496), with an average book to market ratio of 0.4685 and 
a leverage level of 39.74%. On average, firms exhibit a Beta of 0.8945.  
Table III. COE Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 




 KES 4276 0.0868 0.0799 0.0384 -0.0431 0.3056 
 KOJ 4276 0.0843 0.0759 0.0415 0.0014 0.596 
 COE 4276 0.0855 0.0782 0.0358 0.0201 0.2846 
 Comb_ESG 4276 54.3284 55.34 18.1762 1.88 93.88 
 Beta 4276 0.8945 0.8851 0.3219 0.028 2.2817 
 Size 4276 15.9496 15.9306 1.433 10.5383 19.9788 
 BTM 4276 0.4685 0.377 0.3314 0.0011 4.0692 
 Lev 4276 0.3974 0.237 0.5606 0 11.8426 
 Disp 4276 0.1083 0.0565 0.5939 0 27.375 
 LTG 4276 0.1101 0.0922 0.1137 -0.2825 2.068 
All variables are described in Appendix IV. 
 
4.2.2. Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Appendix VI presents the Pearson correlation matrix. A statistically significant positive 
correlation (0.0553) is found between the average implied cost of equity and the Combined 
ESG score. Overall, there is a statistically significant correlation between independent 
variables. The correlation between Lev and BTM, with a coefficient of 0.533 (p-value < 0.01), 
is relatively high. Once again, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were computed for all 
variables and all results are low (< 2), which indicates that potential multicollinearity is not a 
major concern and all variables are kept in the model.  
4.2.3. Model Results 
Table IV reports the main results from the COE-CSP regressions estimated using the pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares method. In all models, the dependent variable is the average implied 
cost of equity, COE. Several CSR metrics are included as explanatory variables and all model 
specifications include six firm-specific control variables, as well as year, industry, and country 
effects.  
Model (1) seeks to examine the association between corporate social performance and the 
implied cost of equity. Regarding the Comb_ESG variable, a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (p-value < 0.01) is reported across all models. This result is in line with 
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the majority of research done on the COE-CSR relationship (Sharfman & Fernando, 2008; El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2018), suggesting that firms which are more socially 
responsible are rewarded by investors with a lower cost of equity capital. As an association 
between CSP and COE is found across all models, there’s support for the notion that a firm’s 
corporate social responsibility is priced in by investors. Thus, H1.B is validated.  
Once again, Model (2) employs IndDev to explore the CSP-COE relationship considering 
deviations from the industry median. Comb_ESG is still negative and significant at the 1% 
level. Interestingly, IndDev shows a positive coefficient, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
From this result, it can be inferred that negative deviations from the industry median (negative 
IndDev) are seen as beneficial by investors, who require lower equity premiums. On the other 
hand, when a firm CSP is above the industry median level, its implied cost of equity increases. 
This means that investing in corporate social responsibility up until a level equal to industry 
peers is seen as valuable by investors while overinvesting in CSR is seen as a waste of resources. 
The results are further explored in section 4.3. in order to better examine this association.  
Results from Model (3) report a positive but not statistically significant coefficient on 
SqrDev. By squaring the deviation from the industry mean, the model emphasizes under and 
overinvestments. Although the coefficient is positive, one cannot conclude that bigger 
deviations have an impact on the CSP-COE relationship, as the p-value is higher than 0.10. 
Regarding firm-specific control variables, a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
is reported for all variables across the three models, at the 1% significance level. Furthermore, 
all control variables exhibit the expected sign, except for Size. Interestingly, Size exhibits a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level, contrary to the consistent 
negative association found in the literature (El Ghoul et al., 2011), implying that bigger firms 
tend to pay higher equity premiums. However, this positive association might have to do with 
sample selection, as I restrict the sample to firms which are constituents of the STOXX600, 
thus all relatively large in Size terms, so that no true differentiation between large and small 
firms can be made.  
The control variable Beta shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level in all specified models. This finding is consistent with that of Hail and Leuz (2006) and 
El Ghoul et al. (2011). The book to market ratio (BTM) variable yields a positive coefficient, 
statistically significant at the 1% level across all models, indicating that investors require higher 
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equity premiums for firms with lower growth opportunities. Regarding the control variable Lev, 
its coefficient is in the correct direction and significant at p-value < 0.01. Results are in line 
with previous studies by Gode and Mohanram (2003), Hail and Leuz (2006) and El Ghoul et 
al. (2011). 
Table IV. COE Regression Models Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.0313*** 0.0489*** 0.0488*** 
 (4.16) (5.38) (5.36) 
Comb_ESG -0.000141*** -0.000551*** -0.000548*** 
 (-4.71) (-4.47) (-4.45) 
IndDev  0.000425*** 0.000424*** 
  (3.43) (3.43) 
SqrDev   0.000000884 
   (0.70) 
Beta 0.00895*** 0.00988*** 0.00990*** 
 (5.09) (5.56) (5.57) 
Size 0.00232*** 0.00221*** 0.00221*** 
 (5.48) (5.21) (5.20) 
BTM 0.0285*** 0.0283*** 0.0282*** 
 (16.10) (15.99) (15.95) 
Lev 0.00894*** 0.00903*** 0.00905*** 
 (8.97) (9.08) (9.10) 
Disp 0.00652*** 0.00653*** 0.00654*** 
 (8.74) (8.76) (8.77) 
LTG 0.0749*** 0.0746*** 0.0746*** 
 (18.81) (18.74) (18.75) 
Year  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes 
Country  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4276 4276 4276 
Adj. R-Squared 0.374 0.376 0.376 
F-Test 51.16 50.53 49.58 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (1), (2) and (3) 
– Pooled OLS. t statistics are presented in parentheses. 
All variables are defined in Appendix IV.  
Both analysts forecast variables, the 1-year-ahead EPS forecast dispersion (Disp) and the 
consensus long-term growth forecast (LTG), are in line with previous studies (El Ghoul et al., 
2011) and have a statistically significantly (p-value < 0.01) effect on the implied cost of equity 
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across the three models. As such, the results imply that the market requires higher equity 
premiums for riskier, higher long-term growth and more leveraged firms, as well as for firms 
displaying more disperse analyst forecast. 
4.3. Underinvestment and Overinvestment Group Samples 
To further explore the implications related to firms under and overinvesting in CSR, each 
sample was partitioned into underinvestment (ESG ≤ industry median) and overinvestment 
(ESG > industry median) subsamples, using IndDev as the explanatory variable. For the 
underinvestment subsample, negative IndDev values were converted to absolute ones, thus 
higher IndDev represent higher negative deviations from the industry median (lower scores). 
For parsimony, only IndDev coefficients are reported in Table V, although both models contain 
the respective full set of control variables as well as year, industry, and country indicators, 
which present the expected signs at the standard significance levels.  
Panel A. reports a statistically insignificant negative relationship between IndDev and COD 
for firms in the underinvestment group, and a positive statistically significant IndDev for the 
overinvestment group (p-value < 0.01). The results indicate that negative divergences from the 
industry median are not priced in by lenders, while companies with above industry median 
scores are penalized with higher interest rates. It also suggests that the positive coefficient on 
IndDev found in Models (2) and (3) of Table II are only significant for those firms overinvesting 
in CSR. These results further support the conclusion of Jung et al. (2018), which suggest that 
lenders perceive a firm’s carbon risk differently regarding high and low emitting industries.  
Alternatively, Panel B results show a positive relationship between COE and IndDev for 
the underinvestment subsample, significant at the 5% level, and a statistically insignificant 
negative coefficient for the overinvestment group. This suggests that negative divergences from 
the industry median translate into higher required equity premiums. From a different 
perspective, this also suggests that CSR investments are rewarded up until an industry-standard 
level for firms lagging in CSP.  
These results are interesting, with a possible explanation deriving from the contrasting 
resources allocation approaches between investors and lenders. While lenders are only 
interested in those firms wasting resources beyond some optimal level, investors are worried if 
firms present CSP below their peers, supporting the overinvestment and risk mitigation 
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theories, respectively. Thus, as the association between CSP seems to change based on whether 
firms are considered as underinvestors or overinvestors, Hypotheses 2.A and 2.B. are validated.  
Table V. Additional tests exploring the COC-CSP relationship nature. 










IndDev -0.0000873 0.000164*** 0.000144** -0.0000360 
 (-1.27) (2.64) (2.10) (-0.51) 
Firm-controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2010 2303 1950 2254 
Adj. R-Squared 0.253 0.299 0.414 0.364 
F-Test 13.62 19.49 27.96 26.32 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. t statistics are 
presented in parentheses. 
All variables used in Panel A and Panel B models are described in Appendices III and IV, respectively. 
4.4. Robustness and Additional Tests 
4.4.1. Alternative measures for Corporate Social Responsibility, Cost of Equity and 
Cost of Debt 
There is no consensus in the literature on the best proxies for CSP, COE and COD measures. 
As such, different dependent and explanatory variables are employed to test the robustness of 
previous results. 
Regarding the COD-CSP relationship, I follow Álvarez-Botas and González (2019) and 
subtract the industry median value from cost of debt, resulting in a cost of debt “premium” as 
an alternative measure. The re-estimated models are reported in Appendix VII. Model (1) shows 
a positive Comb_ESG coefficient (p-value < 0.01), in line with previous findings. This further 
supports the notion that lenders penalize CSP. Models (2) and (3) report a negative Comb_ESG 
coefficient but without statistical significance. These results are not surprising, considering the 
industry adjusted ESG score (IndDev) reports a positive and highly statistically significant 
coefficient (p-value < 0.01), possibly shadowing any explanatory power a firm’s ESG score 
might have on cost of debt measure, which is also adjusted to the industry median. Once again, 
variable SqrDev shows no impact on the relationship. 
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Following El Ghoul et al. (2011), the COE models are re-estimated by replacing the 
dependent variable COE with the individual cost of equity premiums from the Easton (KES) and 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (KOJ) models, as well as the earnings-to-price (KEP) ratio, as 
described in Appendix A. The EP ratio is a special case of the Easton (2004) model, which 
assumes no abnormal earnings growth. Results are reported in Appendix VIII. Across all 
models, a negative Comb_ESG coefficient is found, statistically significant at the 1% level, 
confirming previous conclusions that CSP helps decrease the cost of equity. Variable IndDev 
loads a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level in Panel A and Panel B 
models, and a 5% significance level in models from Panel C. SqrDev shows no statistical 
significance in any model, in line to previous results.  
The combined ESG score (Comb_ESG) employed in previous models is discounted when 
companies are involved in ESG controversies. To better understand the direct effect of CSR on 
the relationship, I use the ESG score (ESG) provided by Refinitiv, which is unaffected by 
controversies. Furthermore, both IndDev and SqrDev are re-calculated using the ESG score. 
Untabulated robustness tests display similar coefficient results to previous models in Tables II 
and IV. Regarding the COD-CSP relationship, a positive and statistically significant 
relationship is found between ESG and COD, in line with previous findings. Re-testing Models 
(2) and (3), ESG becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting scores adjusted for 
controversies affecting firms help better explain the COD-CSP relationship, implying that 
lenders price in such events in their activities. IndDev shows a positive coefficient (p-value < 
0.05), while SqrDev is not significant.  
Regarding the results from COE-CSP relationship, ESG is negative at the standard 
significant levels across all models. IndDev shows a positive sign (p-value 0.05), while SqrDev 
is not significant. These results are in line with those reported in Table IV. Although results are 
generally robust, the higher Adjusted R-Squared scores and lower statistical significance levels 
reported in Tables II and IV suggest that the Combined ESG score is more adequate when 
measuring the COC-CSP relationship, enhancing the impact of controversies in the 
relationships.  
Finally, initial models are re-estimated using the industry average ESG score to compute 
variables IndDev and SqrDev. Untabulated results show that the alternative variables present 
equal signs and statistically significant levels to results in Tables II and IV. Overall, the results 
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are robust for the various alternative measures and models used to access the association 
between COC and CSP.  
4.4.2. Results for the Under-and Overinvestment robustness tests 
In this section, results from Table V are tested using the alternative measures of cost of debt 
and cost of equity, as described in section 4.4.1. Negative deviations (for the Underinvestment 
subsamples) are measured in absolute terms. Untabulated results report a statistically 
insignificant negative IndDev, suggesting that when firms exhibit lower than average ESG 
scores (CSR investment), lenders do not price such activities. On the contrary, IndDev is 
positive and statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) for firms with higher than industry median 
CSP, implying that lenders penalize CSR industry leaders with higher costs of debt.  
Models from Table IV are re-estimated using the Easton (KES), Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth (KOJ) and Earnings–price ratio (KEP) measures as alternative COE measures. For the 
Underinvestment subsamples, results show that IndDev is positive across all models and 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels for KES and KEP measures, respectively, 
although not significant for the KOJ measure. This confirms previous findings that the lower the 
CSP of a firm when compared with peers, the higher the cost of equity. It also means that 
investing in CSR is rewarded until the industry median level. Regarding the Overinvestment 
subsample, IndDev is not statistically significant for every alternative COE measure. 
Overall, previous findings are robust when considering alternative dependent variables. 
There is a reinforcement of the idea that debt markets penalize industry leaders in CSR, once 
again alluding to the proposition that lenders penalize the pursuit of corporate responsibility 
beyond a “sufficient” level. While firms are not rewarded for lower CSP in relation to industry 
peers, they are disincentivized from being more responsible than necessary. On the other hand, 
results suggest that low CSP firms that improve their score are rewarded by the equity markets, 
while there is no meaningful relationship between CSP and COE for industry leaders. 
4.5. Crisis impact on the cost of capital – CSP relationship  
This section examines whether periods of crisis affect the relationship between CSP and the 
cost of capital. Bae et al. (2018) affirm that firms pay significantly higher loan spreads during 
crisis periods, while El Ghoul et al. (2018) suggest that corporate environmental responsibility 
becomes irrelevant during such periods. Models in Table II and IV are re-estimated after 
partitioning both COD and COE samples into two periods: crisis periods, considering years 
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from 2008 to 2012 (financial and sovereign debt crisis)4, and stability periods (2002-2007 and 
2013-2018). For parsimony, Table VI omits results regarding control variables, as most 
coefficients exhibit the predicted signs at the standard statistical significance levels. For 
parsimony, SqrDev is not included in the analysis, as previous findings find no effect of it on 
the COC-CSP relationship.  
Table VI. Regression results for the impact of crisis periods on the COC-CSP association 
 Panel A. COD Model Panel B. COE Model 
Variables Crisis Stability Crisis Stability 
Comb_ESG 0.000163 -0.000380*** 0.0000872 -0.000599*** 
 (0.53) (-2.78) (0.22) (-4.68) 
IndDev 0.0000276 0.000487*** -0.000303 0.000514*** 
 (0.09) (3.59) (-0.75) (4.01) 
Firm-controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1356 3027 1111 3165 
Adj. R-Squared 0.227 0.293 0.328 0.404 
F-Test 10.23 26.11 14.86 46.59 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. t statistics are 
presented in parentheses. 
All variables used in Panel A and Panel B models are presented in Appendices III and IV, respectively. 
Panel A presents the results regarding the COD-CSP relationship, where both coefficients 
on Comb_ESG and IndDev are positive but statistically insignificant during crisis periods. 
During stability periods, Panel A reports a negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
Comb_ESG (p-value < 0.01) and a positive one on IndDev (at the 1% level). Panel B exhibits 
equivalent results for the COE sample, with both coefficients on Comb_ESG and IndDevv 
showing statistically insignificant coefficients during crisis periods. For the stability subsample, 
a negative and a statistically significant coefficient on Comb_ESG is found (p-value < 0.01), 
while IndDev is positive and significant at the 1% level.  
These results validate H3.A and H3.B, and are in line with studies such as La Rosa et al. 
(2018) and El Ghoul et al. (2018), who find no statistically significant relationship between 
CSP and COD and CSP and COE during periods of crisis, respectively. Both studies advance 
the explanation that during periods of crisis, firms prioritize avoiding financial distress and 
 
4 There is no clear consensus regarding the crisis period. I consider the period from 2008 to 2012, as defined 
in the European Business Cycle Indicators Technical Paper on October 11, 2016.  
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bankruptcy, as well as maintaining profitability levels. The positive effects CSR might have on 
the cost of capital, by reducing the probability of negative events or increasing moral capital, 
become secondary in such circumstances. Furthermore, El Ghoul et al. (2018) point to investor 
short-termism during crisis periods, who emphasize short term financial performance over 
long-term CSR performance. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this study is to analyse the association between corporate social 
performance and the cost of equity and debt, for firms belonging to the STOXX600. A sample 
of a maximum of 413 firms was used to study each relationship, analysed during the 2002 to 
2018 period. 
In line with Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Menz (2010) and Magnanelli and Izzo (2017) 
the current study suggests a positive relationship between corporate social performance and the cost 
of debt, indicating that socially responsible firms are penalized by lenders through an increase in 
interest rates. On the other hand, this study points to a negative relationship between corporate 
social performance and the cost of equity, in line with Sharfman and Fernando (2008) and El Ghoul 
et al. (2011, 2018). This suggests that investors reward firms displaying higher corporate social 
performance with lower required equity premiums.  
When comparing CSP with industry peers, results point to an optimal level of CSR investment. 
In the first analysis regarding both relationships, lenders and investors seem to penalize firms who 
overinvest in CSR (CSP above industry-standard) and reward those who underinvest in CSR 
(bellow industry-standard CSP). Robustness tests suggest that lenders are only sensitive to firms 
who overinvest in CSR, while investors are sensitive only to firms who underinvest in CSR. 
Furthermore, results indicate that the magnitude of the deviation from the optimal level does not 
have an additional impact on the relationships.  
The study results are robust for alternative measures of corporate social performance, cost of 
debt and cost of equity, as well as to alternative models employing these alternative measures to 
test under-and overinvestment theories regarding debt and equity markets.  
However, previous research suggests that the impact of CSR on the cost of capital varies 
depending on the economic cycle, with mixed results (El Ghoul et al., 2018; La Rosa et al., 2018; 
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Suto & Takehara, 2017). This study finds that during periods of financial crisis, CSR and the degree 
of under-and overinvestment in CSR activities become irrelevant to both lenders and investors. 
This study is innovative and important for several reasons, offering practical implications for 
managers and policy makers. First, it is the first study analysing both COE-CSP and COD-CSP 
relationships on a European context that analyses the optimal level of CSP performance concerning 
firms in the same industry. It also provides evidence on the pricing of CSP by the capital markets, 
helping to shed some light into the mixed results advanced by the literature. It further supports the 
growing importance of considering CSR as value relevant when defining a business strategy, as its 
impact on COC urges managers to think beyond just financial measures. Moreover, the results point 
to divergent positioning by lenders and investors regarding CSR. While lenders seem to perceive 
CSR investments as a waste of resources, investors perceive them as mitigators of risk. This forces 
socially responsible managers to weight the cost of each source of capital when allocating firm 
resources. This study further examines how capital markets perceive CSR leaders and laggers 
within an industry. Investors seem to reward CSP laggers which invest in CSR up to the industry 
CSP median, while lenders penalize overinvestments (i.e. leaders with CSP above the industry 
median). Moreover, the magnitude of the deviation seems to be irrelevant when already controlling 
for CSP and industry positioning. This study finds no evidence that CSR has a meaningful impact 
on cost of capital during periods of financial crisis.  
Finally, environmental and social issues such as climate change have been behind major 
political policies aiming towards a more sustainable future. One such example is the Paris 
Agreement, adopted by nearly every nation in 2015, to achieve climate-neutrality before the end of 
the century. In order to make finance flows consistent with the long-term climate goals, policy 
makers who champion such actions must also understand how the capital markets price sustainable 
activities and regulate accordingly. 
The main limitation of this study has to do with the measurement of CSP and the ability to 
generalize study findings, as prior research employs various measurement methods, which vary 
considerably across rating providers and geographies (Du et al., 2017; Schoenmaker et al., 2018). 
Another limitation inherent to every study has to do with the measurement of cost of equity and 
cost of debt. Even though this study employs measures of cost of capital widely used in the 
literature, different estimation methods use contrasting valuation models and assumptions, which 
may impact regression results (Schoenmaker et al., 2018). 
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As future research, an equivalent study can be developed that explores how different measures 
of CSP impact the relationship with cost of capital. Future research might also focus on building a 
comprehensive theoretical framework that contributes to a better understanding of how CSR 
impacts the cost of capital, as only few paper have attempted to do so (Heinkel et al., 2001; Godfrey, 
2005). Finally, future research should further explore any non-linearities in the relationship, as 
current studies are scarce (Schoenmaker et al., 2018).  
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Appendix A. Implied cost of equity capital models 
Common variables: 
𝑃𝑡= stock price at year t end; 
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+𝜏 = forecasted earnings per share for year 𝑡 + 𝜏; 
𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡+1 = expected divided per share for year 𝑡 + 1.  
Model 1: Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model (2005, OJ) 
This model is a generalization of the Gordon constant growth model. It relates the current price 
(𝑃𝑡) to estimated one-year-ahead earnings per share (𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1), two-year-ahead earnings per 
share (𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+2), forecasted dividends per share (𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡+1), and an assumed perpetual growth rate 
gamma (𝛾). The model requires positive 1-year-ahead and 2-year-ahead earnings forecasts in 
order to provide a positive root. The short-term growth ((𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+2 −  𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1)/𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1) is 
assumed to decay asymptotically to (𝛾), which is set to be equal to a long-term economic 
growth rate. The model defines a 1-year explicit forecast horizon, after which forecasted 
earnings grow at a near-term rate that decays to a perpetual rate. Following the Gode and 
Mohanram’s (2003) implementation of the model, the near-term earnings growth rate (𝑔2) is 
the average of: (i) the percentage difference between 2-year-ahead and 1-year-ahead earnings 
forecasts, and (ii) the I/B/E/S long-term growth (LTG) forecast. The real perpetual growth rate 
is also set to 3%, corresponding to a very long-term economic growth rate. The term (𝛾 − 1) is 
set to be equal to the risk-free rate minus 3%, where the risk-free rate is the yield on the 10-
year German bond.  
Because I perform a cross-sectional analysis, the choice of 𝛾 being equal to 3% does not affect 
the overall results, as it only affects the overall level of risk premium and not the relative implied 
risk premia of different firms.  
𝐾𝑂𝐽 = 𝐴 +  √𝐴2 +
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1
𝑃𝑡
(𝑔2 − (𝛾 − 1))  
Where: 
𝐴 =  
1
2
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𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡+1 =  𝑑𝑝𝑠0 








(𝛾 − 1) =  𝑟𝑓 − 0.03 
Model 2: Easton (2004): 
The Easton model is a special case of the abnormal earnings growth valuation model developed 
by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). It allows share price to be expressed in terms of one 
year-ahead (𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1) and two year-ahead (𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+2) earnings per share forecasts, cost of equity 
(𝐾𝐸𝑆) and forthcoming dividends per share (𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡+1) to derive a measure of abnormal earnings 
growth. The explicit forecast horizon is 2 years, after which forecasted abnormal earnings are 
assumed to grow in perpetuity at a constant rate. This model requires positive change in 1-year-
ahead and 2-years-ahead earnings per share forecasts to yield a numerical solution. The 
valuation equation is given by: 
𝑃𝑡 =
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+2 − 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡+1 + (𝐾𝐸𝑆𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡+1)
𝑘𝐸𝑆
2  
Where 𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡+1 =  𝑑𝑝𝑠𝑡 
In this model, the implied cost of equity is the internal rate of return (IRR) that equates the stock 
price derived from the Easton model to the observed stock price, minus the yield on the 10-year 
Germany Treasury bond.  
Alternative model for Robustness Tests  
Model 3: Earnings–price (EP) ratio: 
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Appendix I. Samples composition by country 
 Panel A. Cost of debt Sample Panel B. Cost of equity Sample 
Country N % N % 
Austria 82 1.87 56 1.31 
Belgium 77 1.76 80 1.87 
Denmark 169 3.86 171 4.00 
Finland 178 4.06 134 3.13 
France 675 15.40 697 16.30 
Germany 497 11.34 529 12.37 
Ireland 98 2.24 79 1.85 
Italy 123 2.81 107 2.50 
Luxembourg 41 0.94 30 0.70 
Netherlands 242 5.52 205 4.79 
Norway 124 2.83 101 2.36 
Poland 22 0.50 13 0.30 
Portugal 36 0.82 30 0.70 
Spain 125 2.85 158 3.70 
Sweden 384 8.76 352 8.23 
Switzerland 389 8.88 395 9.24 
United Kingdom 1121 25.58 1139 26.64 
Total 4383 100.00 4276 100.00 
 
Appendix II. Samples composition by industry 
 Panel A. Cost of debt Sample Panel B. Cost of equity Sample 
Industry (ICB) N Percentage (%) N Percentage (%) 
Basic Materials 473 10.79 398 9.31 
Consumer Cyclicals 21 0.48 24 0.56 
Consumer Discretionary 821 18.73 814 19.04 
Consumer Non-Cyclicals 23 0.52 24 0.56 
Consumer Staples 463 10.56 462 10.80 
Energy 202 4.61 164 3.84 
Health Care 472 10.77 483 11.30 
Industrials 1196 27.29 1072 25.07 
Real Estate 17 0.39 156 3.65 
Technology 209 4.77 250 5.85 
Telecommunications 223 5.09 206 4.82 
Utilities 263 6.00 223 5.22 
Total 4383 100.00 4276 100.00 
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Appendix III. Cost of debt model variables definition 
 
Panel A. Dependent variables  
COD Interest expenses / Total interest-bearing debt Francis et al. (2005); La 
Rosa et al. (2018) 
Panel B. Explanatory variables 
Comb_ESG ESG Combined score obtained from Refinitiv database. La Rosa et al. (2018) 
IndDev ESG Combined Score minus Industry-Year Median value Author 
SqrDev Square of IndDev measure Author 
Crisis Crisis periods, considered the period from 2008 to 2012, as defined by the 
European Commission  
European Business Cycle 
Indicators Technical Paper 
(October 11, 2016) 
Panel C. Control variables 
Beta Estimated by regressing 5-year daily stock returns in year t on the STOXX600 
index daily returns. 
La Rosa et al. (2018) 
Size Natural logarithm of a firm's market value at t-1 Ye and Zhang (2011); La 
Rosa et al. (2018) 
TobinQ (Market value + total debt)/total assets Bae et al. (2018); La Rosa 
et al. (2018) 
Liq Current assets/current liabilities La Rosa et al. (2018) 
Lev Total debt/total assets Bae et al. (2018); Huang et 
al. (2017) 
AssetG (Total assetst - total assetst-1)/total assetst-1 La Rosa et al. (2018) 
Tang Property, plant and equipment/total assets Jung, Herbohn and 
Clarkson (2016) 
Perf Income before extraordinary items/sales La Rosa et al. (2018) 
IntCov (Income before extraordinary items + interests exp.)/interests exp. La Rosa et al. (2018) 
OCF Operating cash flow/total assets Goss & Roberts (2011) 
Industry Industry dummy variable based on ICB industry classification.  
Year Year dummy variable.  
Country Country dummy variable  
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Appendix IV. Cost of equity model variables definition 
 
Panel A. Dependent variables 
KOJ 
Implied cost of equity model derived from Ohlson and Juettner-




Implied cost of equity model derived from Easton (2004) model minus 
the 10-year German Treasury bond yield. 
Easton (2004) 
COE 
Cost of Equity: Average of 𝐾𝑂𝐽 and 𝐾𝐸𝑆 . Both models are described in 
appendix A. 
Author 
Panel B. Explanatory variables 
Comb_ESG ESG Combined score obtained from Refinitiv database. 
 
IndDev ESG Combined Score – Industry-Year Median value 
Author 
SqrDev Square of IndDev measure  
Author 
Crisis 
Crisis periods, considered the period from 2008 to 2012, as defined by 
the European Commission 
European Business Cycle 
Indicators Technical Paper 
(October 11, 2016) 
Panel C. Control variables 
Beta 
Market Beta estimated by regressing 5-year daily stock returns in year 
t on the STOXX600 index daily returns.  
El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
Lev Ratio of total debt to the market value of equity 
El et al. (2018) 
BTM 
Book to market ratio computed as (book value of equity /market value 
of equity) 
Fama and French (1992), 
Hail and Leuz (2006) 
LTG Long-term growth forecast reported obtained from I/B/E/S 
El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
Disp 
Dispersion of analyst forecast: Computed as standard deviation of 1-
year-ahead analyst forecasts of earnings per share divided by the mean 
1-year-ahead analyst forecasts of earnings per share.  
Gebhardt, Lee, & 
Swaminathan (2001) 
Industry Industry dummy variable based on ICB industry classification.  
 
Year Year dummy variable.  
Country Country dummy variable.  




Appendix V. Cost of debt Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 COD Comb_ESG Beta Size TobinQ Liq Lev AssetG Tang Perf IntCov OCF 
COD 1            
Comb_ESG -0.119*** 1           
Beta -0.00622 0.237*** 1          
Size -0.135*** 0.401*** 0.110*** 1         
TobinQ -0.0722*** -0.0488*** -0.161*** -0.00416 1        
Liq 0.126*** -0.136*** 0.00837 -0.243*** 0.146*** 1       
Lev -0.247*** 0.0891*** -0.0810*** 0.0638*** -0.0911*** -0.264*** 1      
AssetG -0.105*** -0.0843*** -0.0665*** -0.0151 0.0262* -0.00770 0.0134 1     
Tang -0.0310** 0.0966*** -0.0475*** 0.0973*** -0.101*** -0.185*** 0.167*** -0.0600*** 1    
Perf -0.0787*** 0.00711 -0.192*** 0.125*** 0.336*** 0.151*** -0.0231 0.100*** 0.0346** 1   
IntCov -0.124*** -0.0111 -0.0411*** -0.00229 0.341*** 0.0966*** -0.218*** 0.0277* -0.0433*** 0.188*** 1  
OCF 0.0181 -0.0643*** -0.112*** 0.0163 0.730*** 0.101*** -0.122*** -0.0341** 0.0846*** 0.310*** 0.271*** 1 
Note: *, ** and *** refer to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Variables: COD Interest expenses divided by total interest-bearing debt; Comb_ESG ESG Combined Score provided by Refinitiv; Beta Market Beta; Size Natural logarithm of a firm's 
market value at t-1; TobinQ Summation of market value and total debt, divided by total assets; Liq Current assets divided by current liabilities; Lev Total debt divided by total assets; 
AssetG Yearly relative variation of total assets; Tang Property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; Perf Income before extraordinary items divided by sales; IntCov Income 
before extraordinary items plus interest expenses divided by interest expenses; OCF Operating cash flow divided by total assets 





Appendix VI. Cost of equity Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 KES KOJ COE Comb_ESG Beta Size BTM Lev Disp LTG 
KES 1          
KOJ 0.604
*** 1         
COE 0.887*** 0.904*** 1        
Comb_ESG 0.0479*** 0.0510*** 0.0553*** 1       
Beta 0.323*** 0.237*** 0.310*** 0.192*** 1      
Size 0.176*** 0.157*** 0.185*** 0.383*** 0.237*** 1     
BTM 0.374*** 0.266*** 0.355*** 0.0536*** 0.242*** 0.337*** 1    
Lev 0.268*** 0.187*** 0.253*** 0.0752*** 0.0990*** 0.367*** 0.533*** 1   
Disp 0.193*** 0.0843*** 0.152*** -0.0308** 0.105*** 0.0510*** 0.0740*** 0.0601*** 1  
LTG 0.180*** 0.278*** 0.258*** -0.0279* 0.138*** -0.102*** -0.0137 -0.0753*** 0.0135 1 
Note: *, ** and *** refer to 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Variables: KES Easton model implied cost of equity premium; KOJ Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model implied cost of equity premium; COE Average implied cost of equity premium; 
Comb_ESG ESG combined score provided by Refinitiv; Beta Market Beta; Size Natural logarithm of total assets; Lev Total debt to market value of equity ratio; BTM Book value to 
market value of equity ratio; LTG long-term growth forecast; Disp Coefficient of variation of 1-year-ahead earnings forecast 




Appendix VII. COD Measure Robustness test 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.0677*** 0.0797*** 0.0800*** 
 (8.49) (8.69) (8.71) 
Comb_ESG 0.000131*** -0.000178 -0.000180 
 (4.60) (-1.48) (-1.50) 
IndDev  0.000316*** 0.000316*** 
  (2.64) (2.64) 
SqrDev   -0.000000972 
   (-0.82) 
Beta 0.00496*** 0.00559*** 0.00556*** 
 (3.13) (3.49) (3.47) 
Size -0.00295*** -0.00298*** -0.00299*** 
 (-6.67) (-6.73) (-6.75) 
TobinQ -0.000951* -0.000863* -0.000865* 
 (-1.88) (-1.70) (-1.71) 
Liq 0.00255*** 0.00261*** 0.00262*** 
 (3.99) (4.09) (4.09) 
Lev -0.0797*** -0.0797*** -0.0797*** 
 (-20.06) (-20.08) (-20.06) 
AssetG -0.00689*** -0.00690*** -0.00691*** 
 (-5.73) (-5.74) (-5.75) 
Tang -0.00999*** -0.00979*** -0.00972*** 
 (-3.70) (-3.62) (-3.60) 
Perf -0.00152 -0.00141 -0.00122 
 (-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.23) 
IntCov -0.0000773*** -0.0000774*** -0.0000776*** 
 (-9.41) (-9.44) (-9.45) 
OCF 0.0245*** 0.0235*** 0.0236*** 
 (2.71) (2.60) (2.61) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4383 4383 4383 
Adj. R-Squared 0.167 0.168 0.168 
F-Test 17.27 17.10 16.81 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. t statistics are presented in 
parentheses. 
Variables: COD Interest expenses divided by total interest-bearing debt; Comb_ESG ESG Combined Score provided by 
Refinitiv; IndDev Comb_ESG minus the industry median Combined ESG score; SqrDev Square of IndDev; Beta Market 
Beta; Size Natural logarithm of a firm's market value at t-1; TobinQ Summation of market value and total debt, divided by 
total assets; Liq Current assets divided by current liabilities; Lev Total debt divided by total assets; AssetG Yearly relative 
variation of total assets; Tang Property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; Perf Income before extraordinary items 
divided by sales; IntCov Income before extraordinary items plus interest expenses divided by interest expenses; OCF 
Operating cash flow divided by total assets 
 
 




Appendix VIII. COE Measure Robustness test 
Variables 
Panel A. Easton Model (2004) Panel B. Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth model (2005) Panel C. Earnings–price ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Intercept 0.0443*** 0.0609*** 0.0606*** 0.0183* 0.0369*** 0.0369*** 0.0291*** 0.0401*** 0.0400*** 
 (5.43) (6.18) (6.15) (1.94) (3.24) (3.23) (4.01) (4.57) (4.56) 
Comb_ESG -0.000147*** -0.000534*** -0.000529*** -0.000135*** -0.000568*** -0.000568*** -0.000107*** -0.000364*** -0.000362*** 
 (-4.53) (-4.00) (-3.97) (-3.60) (-3.68) (-3.67) (-3.70) (-3.06) (-3.05) 
IndDev  0.000401*** 0.000399***  0.000449*** 0.000448***  0.000266** 0.000266** 
  (2.99) (2.98)  (2.89) (2.89)  (2.23) (2.23) 
SqrDev   0.00000156   0.000000209   0.000000566 
   (1.14)   (0.13)   (0.46) 
Beta 0.0124*** 0.0132*** 0.0133*** 0.00554** 0.00652*** 0.00653*** -0.00799*** -0.00741*** -0.00739*** 
 (6.50) (6.88) (6.90) (2.52) (2.93) (2.93) (-4.72) (-4.32) (-4.31) 
Size 0.00176*** 0.00165*** 0.00165*** 0.00289*** 0.00277*** 0.00277*** 0.00442*** 0.00435*** 0.00435*** 
 (3.83) (3.59) (3.58) (5.44) (5.20) (5.20) (10.80) (10.60) (10.60) 
BTM 0.0326*** 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 0.0244*** 0.0242*** 0.0241*** 0.0259*** 0.0258*** 0.0257*** 
 (17.01) (16.90) (16.85) (11.00) (10.89) (10.88) (15.19) (15.10) (15.08) 
Lev 0.0106*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.00730*** 0.00740*** 0.00741*** 0.00397*** 0.00403*** 0.00404*** 
 (9.81) (9.89) (9.93) (5.85) (5.93) (5.93) (4.13) (4.20) (4.21) 
Disp 0.00932*** 0.00933*** 0.00934*** 0.00372*** 0.00373*** 0.00373*** -0.00594*** -0.00593*** -0.00593*** 
 (11.54) (11.56) (11.57) (3.97) (3.99) (3.99) (-8.25) (-8.25) (-8.24) 
LTG 0.0496*** 0.0493*** 0.0494*** 0.100*** 0.0998*** 0.0998*** -0.0388*** -0.0390*** -0.0390*** 
 (11.51) (11.45) (11.46) (20.05) (19.99) (19.99) (-10.12) (-10.17) (-10.17) 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4276 4276 4276 4276 4276 4276 4276 4276 4276 
Adj. R-Squared 0.363 0.364 0.364 0.268 0.270 0.269 0.325 0.326 0.326 
F-Test 48.73 48.06 47.18 31.74 31.34 30.74 41.41 40.75 39.97 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
